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Recent Cases
DISBARMENT OF ATtORNEYs-AcTs OUTSIDE PROFESSIONAL DUTIES
In re Falzone1
The principal case, decided by the St. Louis Court of Appeals, presents an
interesting problem as to what types of misconduct not directly connected with the
practice of law are grounds for disbarment.
A lawyer who was a member of the state senate was charged with soliciting a
bribe from persons interested in certain legislation. The special commissioner, ap-
pointed by the court of appeals, found respondent guilty as charged and recom-
mended his disbarment. The court upheld the findings of the commissioner and
respondent was disbarred for violation of Rule 4.472 of the Missouri Supreme Court.
While Rule 4 of the Missouri Supreme Court is, in general, a restatement of
the Canons of Profession Ethics of the American Bar Association, those canons
contain no rule corresponding to Missouri Rule 4.47. This, however, does not Tnean
that the Missouri courts require a higher standard of conduct than that called for
by other courts. It is generally recognized by the courts that an attorney must
maintain a standard of conduct in his dealings with his fellow men which is indica-
tive of a moral fitness to be entrusted with the duties and privileges that are at-
tached to the office of attorney. A lawyer's conduct must not tend to lower the
Bar in the public estimation or bring disgrace upon the profession.3
In suspending a lawyer for misconduct while acting as probate judge and sheriff,
the Kansas City Court of Appeals said:
"Ally conduct on the part of an attorney evidencing his unfitness for
the confidence and trust which attend the relation of attorneys and client
and practice of law before the courts, showing such a lack of personal hon-
esty or of good moral character as to render him unworthy of public con-
fidence, cdnstitutes a ground for his disbarment." (Court's italics)4
The courts will not allow a lawyer to be an honest lawyer and a dishonest
business man. Hence attorneys have been disbarred or suspended for fraud and
1. 220 S.W. 2d 765 (Mo. 1949).
2. "General Rule Governing Certain Conduct of Lawyers-A lawyer should
always maintain his integrity; and shall not wilfully commit any act against the
interests of the public; nor shall he violate his duty to the courts or his clients; nor
shall he, by any misconduct, commit any offense against the laws of Missouri or the
United States of America, which amounts to a crime involving acts done by him
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals; nor. shall he be guilty of any
other misconduct whereby, for the protection of the public and those charged with
the administration of justice, he should no longer be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney."
3. In re Fischer, 231 App. Div. 193, 274 N. Y. Supp. 168 (1st Dep't 1930).
(Suspension for owning a monetary interest in a club where gambling was allowed.)
4. In~ re Williams, 233 Mo. App. 1174, 128 S.W. 2d 1098 (1939), conforming
to mandate State ex rel. Clarke v. Shamn, 343 Mo. .542, 122 S.W. 2d 882 (1938),
quashing In re Williams, 113 S.W. 2d 353 (Mo. App. 1938).
(309)
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trickery in business transactions,6 dishonestly evading personal debts,6 passing
worthless checks,7 acting to defraud their creditors, s mishandling funds entrusted
to their care for investment,9 and for failure to pay income taxes.10
It is universally agreed that breach of the fiduciary duties created by a trustee-
beneficiary relationship is ground for dsicipline.11
Misbehavior as a judge42 as well as failure to carry out faithfully the duties
of office as prosecuting attorney"3 have also justified discipline. Perjury' 4 and par-
ticipating in unlawful assemblies'" and membership in revolutionary societieslo are
grounds for disciplinary action. In these instances, it is plain that the lawyer's
conduct violates his oath to uphold the law.
5. Re Cruickshank, 47 Cal. App. 496, 190 Pac. 1038 (1920); Re Wilson, 79
Kan. 450, 100 Pac. 75 (1909); In re Waleen, 190 Minn. 13, 250 N.W. 798 (1933);
Re Skinner, 171 Minn. 437, 214 N.W. 652 (1927); In re Butcher, 269 App. Div.
545, 56 N.Y.S. 2d 230 (Ist Dep't 1945); Re Goldstein, 220 App. Div. 107, 220 N. Y.
Supp. 473 (3rd Dep't 1927); Re Issacs, 172 App. Div. 181, 159 N. Y. Supp. 403
(1st Dep't 1916); State ex rel. Montgomery v. Estes, 105 Ore. 173, 209 Pac. 486
(1922).
.6. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n. v. Hoering, 317 Ill. 390, 148 N.E. 299
(1925); Re Young, 75 N. J. Law 83, 67 Atl. 717 (1907); Re Kalisky, 169 App. Div.
531, 155 N. Y. Supp. 550 (1st Dep't 1915).
7. In re Wells, 293 Ky. 201, 168 S.W. 2d 730 (1943); In re Shapiro, 263 App.
Div. 659, 34 N.Y.S. 2d 285 (1st Dep't 1942); Re Smith, 216 App. Div. 173, 213
N. Y. Supp. 751 (1st Dep't 1926); Re Boland, 127 App. Div. 746, 11 N. Y. Supp.
932 (1st Dep't 1908); In re Osmond, 174 Okla. 561, 54 P. 2d 319 (1935); In re
State v. Mannix, 133 Ore. 329, 288 Pac. 507, rehearing denied 290 Pac. 745 (1930).
8. Re Berkley, 174 App. Div. 205, 160 N. Y. Supp. 1093 (1st Dep't 1916);
Re Egan, 52 S. D. 394, 218 N.W. 1 (1928).
9. In re Lundeen, 200 Minn. 577, 274 N.W. 825 (1937); State ex Tel. Hunter
v. Marconit, 134 Neb. 898, 280 N.W. 216 (1938); Re Boland, 127 App. Div. 746,
111 N. Y. Supp. 932 (1st Dep't 1908); Re Turner, 104 Wash. 276, 176 Pac. 332
(1918).
10. In re Kaemmerer, 178 S.W. 2d 474 (Mo. App. 1944).
11. In re Buder, 217 S.W. 2d 563 (Mo. 1949); In re Conner, 207 S.W. 2d 492
(Mo. 1948); In re Arrow, 248 App. Div. 490, 290 N. Y. Supp. 677 (1st Dep't 1936).
12. In re Williams, 233 Mo. App. 1174, 128 S.W. 2d 1098 (1939); Bar Ass'n.
v. Sullivan, 185 Cal. 621, 198 Pac. 7 (1921); State v. Peck, 88 Conn. 447, 91 At.
274, L.R.A. 1915A 663, Ann. Cas. 1917B 227 (1914); People ex rel. Stead v. Phipps,
261 Ill. 576, 104 N.E. 144 (1914); Hobbs Case, 75 N. H. 285, 73 Atl. 303 (1909);
Re Dellenbaugh, 170 Ohio C. C. 106, 9 Ohio C. D. 325 (1899).
13. In re Faubion, 101 S.W. 2d 103 (Mo. App. 1937); In re Lyons, 162 Mo.
App. 688, 145 S.W. 844 (1912); Re Cowdery, 69 Cal. 32, 10 Pac. 47, 58 Am. Rep.
545 (1886); People ex rel. Colorado Bar Assn v. Anglim, 33 Colo. 40, 78 Pac. 687
(1904); Re Norris, 60 Kan. 649, 57 Pac. 528 (1899); Re Simpson, 9 N. D. 379, 83
N.W. 541 (1900); Re Voss, 11 N. D. 540, 90 N.W. 1$ (1902); State v. Hayes, 64
W. Va. 45, 61 S.E. 355 (1908).
14. Re Mills, 1 Mich. 392 (1850); Re Popper, 193 App. Div. 505, 184 N. Y.
Supp. 406 (1st Dep't 1920); In re Schecht, 242 App. Div. 495, 27$ N. Y. Supp.
712 (1st Dep't 1934); In re Schachne, 5 Fed. Supp. 680 (E.D.N.Y. 1934); 9 A.L.R.
at 200.
15. Bx parte Wall, 107 U. S. 265 (1882); Re Hanna, 30 N. M. 96, 227 Pac.
983 (1924); State ex rel. McLaughlin v. Graves, 73 Ore. 331, 144 Pac. 484 (1914);
Jone's Case, 2 Pa. Dist. R. 538, 12 Pa. Co. Ct. 229 (1893); Doremenon's Case, 1
Mart. 129 (La. 1810).
16. Re Smith, 133 Wash. 145, 233 Pac. 288, 43 A.L.R. 102 (1925). Also see
Margolis' Case, 269 Pa. 112 Ad. 478, 12 A.L.R. 1186 (1921).
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In his private life, an attorney's conduct is expected to evince a standard that
is compatible with common honesty and decency. Any action which is indicative
of moral turpitude17 warrants the lawyer's disbarment or suspension. The courts
have disciplined for selling opium, Is seduction on promise of marriage,19 adultery,20
obtaining money under a false promise of marriage, 21 selling liquor in violation of
prohibition laws, 22 and habitual drunkenness which prevents a lawyer from properly
discharging his duties to the court or his clients.23
An attorney who aids or abets the "policy" or "numbers" rackets by advising
racketeers engaged therein,24 or who, while knowing the guilt of a defendant in a
criminal action, testifies as a character witness, 25 will be disbarred. Such conduct
is a misuse of the office of lawyer.
Solicitation or acceptance of bribes as well as attempted bribery, has also been
held to be conduct involving moral turpitude.20 It would seem, therefore, that the
principal case, decided under Missouri Rule 4.47, is consistent with the general
trend of decisions as to what conduct not directly connected with the practice of
the law justifies disciplinary proceedings. GEORGE M. WINGER
PLEADING-AMENDMENT NAMING CORPORATION AS DEFENDANT-STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS
Daiprai v. Moberly Fuel & Transfer Co.1
Where an action is erroneously brought against a group of individuals as a
17. Moral turpitude has been defined by the Missouri courts as: "an act of
baseness, vileness, or depravity in private and social duties which a man owes to his
fellow men or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of
right and duty between man and man; everything done contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty and good morals." See In re Wallace, 323 Mo. 203, 19 S.W. 2d 625 (1929).
18. In re McNeese, 346 Mo. 425, 142 S.W. 2d 33 (Mo. 1942).
19. It re Wallace, supra, note 18.
20. Grievance Committee v. Broder, 112 Conn. 269, 152 Atl. 292 (1930); Re
Titus, 66 Hun. 632, 21 N. Y. Supp. 724 (2nd Dep't 1892). But see contra State v.
Byrkett, 40 Ohio S. & C. P. Dec. (1895), holding that a lawyer who seduced his
secretary should not be disbarred unless the misconduct in his private capacity in-
volved moral turpitude, or evinced a lack of honesty, integrity, and veracity; Re
H ........ T ....... , 2 Pennyp. 84 (Pa. 1882), holding by way of dictum that fornica-
tion was not an offense warranting disbarment.
21. In re Raileanu, 225 App. Div. 90, 232 N. Y. Supp. 175 (1st Dep't 1928).
22. Underwood v. Com., 32 Ky. L. Rep. 32, 105 S.W. 151 (1907); State ex
rel. Young v. Edmunson, 103 Ore. 243, 204 Pac. 19 (1922); cf. Bartos v. United
States District Ct., 19 F. 2d 722 (C.C.A. 8th 1927); reversing 13 F. 2d 138 (D.
Neb. 1926) (manufacture of beer by an attorney for his own use, though illegal,
involved no moral turpitude).
23. In re Wells, 293 Ky. 201, 168 S.W. 2d 730 (1943); Re Macy, 109 Kan.
1, 196 Pac. 1095, 14 A.L.R. 848 (1921); In re Osmond, 174 Okla. 561, 54 P. 2d
319 (1935).
24. Re Richards, 333 Mo. 907, 63 S.W. 2d 672 (1933); In re Davis, 252 App.
Div. 591, 299 N. Y. Supp. 632 (1st Dep't 1937).
25. In re Schachne, 5 Fed. Supp. 680 (E.D.N.Y. 1934).
26. In re Wellcome, 23 Mont. 213, 58 Pac. 47 (1899); In re Chernoff, 344 Pa.
527, 26 A. 2d 335 (1942). See also cases cited under note 14, supra.
1. 223 S.W. 2d 474 (Mo. 1949).
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partnership, and the petition is amended to correctly designate the defendant as
a corporation, the statute of limitations having run in the interim, the question
arises as to whether the cause of action has been so changed by the substitution
of party defendant as to bar plaintiff's recovery against the corporation.
In the principal case, P sued A, B, and C as copartners doing business as the
above-named company. The action was brought one day before the running of the
statute of limitations. A, B, and C were all served with process, and filed a joint
motion to make definite and certain, or for a bill of particulars. While this motion
was still pending, and without leave of court, P amended her petition making the
company the sole defendant, and alleging it to be a corporation, the statute of
limitations having run on the action after the filing of the original petition and
before the filing of the amended petition. Service of the amended petition was made
on the corporation. A, B, and C were the sole "owners," i.e., directors, officers, and
shareholders of the company, both at the time the original petition was filed, and
when the amended petition was filed. Defendant's motion to dismiss, on the
ground that the amended petition constituted an entire substitution of parties
defendant, was granted by the circuit court. The Supreme Court of Missouri,
holding that the amended petition was barred by the statute of limitations, affirmed
the judgment. In rejecting P's contention that her amended petition merely cor-
rected a misnomer "by changing the description of the party defendant from that
of a copartnership to a corporation," the court said that this was an amendment
involving two different persons, and that a partnership and a corporation, though
composed of the same members, are two different persons at law.
Amendment correcting misnomer. even after the statute of limitations has run
is permissible,2 the courts applying the doctrine of relation back. Where, however,
the amendment is deemed a substitution or entire change of parties the amendment
will not be allowed,3 the statute of limitations continuing to run in favor of new
parties until they are brought in by process.
However, in addition to cases involving true misnomer, amendment has been
allowed by some courts, after the statute of limitations has run, where both the
original and substituted defendants were artificial legal entities, as distinguished
from natural persons, apparently on the theory that the intent throughout was to
sue a legal entity, and the error was merely in description. 4 A similar result has
been reached where a corporation has been substituted for another corporation,"
2. Godfrey v. Eastern Gas & Fuel Associates, 71 F. Supp. 175 (D. C. Mass.
1947); Evans v. List, 193 Ark. 13, 97 S.W. 2d 73 (1936); Marston v. Tibbetts
Mercantile Co., 110 Me. 533, 87 AtI. 220 (1913).
3. Godfrey v. Eastern Gas & Fuel Associates, supra note 2.
4. Gozdonovic v. Pleasant Hills Realty Co., 357 Pa. 23, 53 A. 2d 73 (1947);
Nelson v. Brenham Compress Oil & Mfg. Co., 51 S.W. 514 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899).
5. McLaughlin v. West End St. R. R., 186 Mass. 150, 71 N.E. 317 (1904).
Contra: Schaffner v. B. & W. Auto Sales Co., 321 Ill. App. 632, 53 N.E. 2d 318(1944) (innocent corporation sued-mistaken identity); cf. McGee v. Ferguson
Seed Farms, 34 S.W. 2d 338 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) (previously-dissolved corpora-
tion originally sued).
4
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an individual for a corporation,6 an individual for an individual,7 and in class
actions.s
Although under normal circumstances a corporation will be treated as a legal
entity, where the fiction is relied upon "... to defeat public convenience, justify
wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the law will regard the corporation as an
association of persons."9 It is submitted that the corporation might here be re-
garded as the three associates in determining the validity of the amendment, in
order to avoid reaching an inequitable result, where the corporation is pleading the
privilege of its separate legal entity merely to invoke the bar of the statute of
limritations. This suggestion is further aided by the theory of the modern federal
and state codes of civil procedure, that cases are to be tried on their merits, rather
than defeated on technical errors.10 A measure of liberality might be justified in
determining the validity of amendment where, as here, the corporation, through its
sole shareholders and officers, had ample notice from the beginning of the plaintiff's
claim and her intention to assert it against the corporation.11
Roy W. McGHEE, JR.
PROPERTY-RACIAL RESTRICTIVE COVENANTs-DAMAGES FOR BREACH
Weiss v. Leaon1
In the now famous case of Shelly v. Kraemer2 the Supreme Court of the United
States held that specific performance by judicial decree of a racial restrictive agree-
ment is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, although the agreement itself is
constitutionally valid. The court left undecided the question as to whether the
Fourteenth Amendment also prohibits an action for damages for the breach of such
an agreement.
6. Manistee Mill Co. v. Hobdy, 165 Ala. 411, 51 So. 871, 138 Am. St. Rep.
73 (1909). But cf. Abrams v. General Financial Corporation, 274 App. Div. 756,
79 N.Y.S. 2d 368 (1st Dep't 1948) (members of partnership substituted for corpo-
ration no longer in existence); Lingar v. Harlan Fuel Co., 298 Ky. 216, 182 S.W.
2d 657 (1944) (partnership and partners substituted for dissolved corporation);
Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Berwald, 65 S.W. 2d 377 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933)
(corporation substituted for partnership and partners).
7. Johnson v. Carroll, 272 Mass. 134, 172 N.E. 85 (1930).
8. Barnes v. Fort, 181 Tenn. 522, 181 S.W. 2d 881 (1944).
9. U. S. v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 Fed. 247, 255 (C. C.
Wis. 1905); accord, State Trust & Savings Bank v. Hermosa Land & Cattle Co.,
30 N. M. 566, 240 Pac. 469 (1925); Bressman, Inc. v. Mosson, 127 Misc. 282, 215
N. Y. Supp. 766 (1st Dep't 1926).
10. Fierstein v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 79 F. Supp. 217, 218 (D. C. Pa. 1948).
11. "Of course, an argument can be made on the other side, but when a de-
fendant has had notice from the beginning that the plaintiff sets up and is trying
to enforce a claim against it because of specified conduct, the reasons for the
statute of limitations do not exist, and we are of the opinion that a liberal rule
should be applied." Holmes, J., in N. Y. Central & Hudson River R. R. v. Kinney,
260 U. S. 340, 346 (1922). See Godfrey v. Eastern Gas & Fuel Associates, supra n.
2, 71 F. Supp. 175 at 178 (D. C. Mass. 1947).
1. 225 S.W. 2d 127 (Mo. 1949).
2. Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 (1948).
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It seems that this question was not considered by any appellate court until
December 12, 1949, when the case of Weiss v. Leao 3 was decided by the Supreme
Court of Missouri. In that case the defendants were owners of a certain lot and
plaintiffs were the owners of other lots in the same subdivision. The lots were
subject to a private restrictive agreement which provided that none of the lots
should be devised, sold, leased or occupied by Negroes for a period of thirty years
from November 5, 1931. Defendants Leaon sold or were about to sell their lot to
Negroes and this suit was brought to enforce the covenant by a judicial decree can-
celling any deed which may have been made to the Negroes or by an injunction
restraining the defendants from conveying their lot to Negroes. This petition was
dismissed by the lower court on the basis of the decision in Shelly v. Kraemcr.4
Plaintiffs then amended the petition, apparently for the purpose of seeking damages
from the defendant for breach of the covenant; the trial court dismissed the amended
petition. The Supreme Court of Missouri, in a per curiam decision, found that
since this question had not been decided in Shelly v. Kraemer5 they were free to
decide it at this time. The court then held that a trial court may hear. and deter-
mine an action for damages for the breach of a racial restrictive covenant without
violating any provisions of the Federal or State Constitutions.
Although the appellate courts, with the exception of the Missouri Supreme
Court, have been silent on the question as to whether a court may grant damages
for the breach of a covenant such as this, there has been no lack of discussion of
the problem in law reviews. William R. Ming, Jr.,6 in his article in the University
of Chicago Law Review7 makes this observation on the judicial enforcement of
penalties or damages for breach of restrictive covenants: "The superiority of specific
performance over an action for damages as a means of excluding the proscribed
group seems obvious. It would appear impossible, however, in the light of the
reasoning of the court in these cases to distinguish a judgment to enforce such a
penalty from a decree in equity ordering specific performance. Each would be
equally state action-and each would be equally within the provision of the Four-
teenth Amendment or the Civil Rights Acts as the case might be." Further on in
this article,8 Mr. Ming makes it more clear that he would not agree with the view
of the Missouri court in the instant case. He points out that until the recent
United States Supreme Court decisions on restrictive covenants, it was not felt that
any provision on state action under the Fourteenth Amendment would impose a
corresponding limitation on the conduct of individuals. However, now it is plain
that that idea must be qualified since if the "private verdict" in question can only
become effective by recourse to a state agency, the Fourteenth Amendment pre-
cludes such recourse. Therefore the amendment does affect some private conduct.
3. Supra note 1.
4. Supra note 2.
5. Ibid.
6. Associate Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.
7. Racial Restrictions and the Fourteentt Amendment: The Restrictive Cove-
nant Cases, 16 U. O Cm. L. REv. 203 at 217 (1949).
8. Id. at 229.
[Vol. 15
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The same conclusion is reached in a somewhat different way by another
writer.9 He points out that judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants involved
two separate kinds of action; first, the act creating the covenant, and second, the
act of enforcing the covenant. The covenant was created by individuals and was
an individual act of discrimination. Therefore, this action is not within the pro-
vision of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the enforcement of the covenant
by the state court is state action and it is such action which is prohibited by the
Fourteenth Amendment. As a result, then, we have a covenant which while it may
be valid, is of little importance because it is unenforceable.
Most of the law review writerso seem to agree that any action by the state
or any of its agencies is state action which is controlled by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
If this view prevails in the Supreme Court of the United States, then the
ruling by the Missouri Supreme Court in the principal case cannot stand. Judgment
had been rendered for the defendant in the trial court, and the case was remanded
for trial on the merits. In the event the plaintiff should recover damages, the Mis-
souri Supreme Court invites a review by the Supreme Court of the United States,
saying: "Furthermore, if a judgment shall be rendered on the merits, rather than
the present judgment merely on the pleadings as now before this court, the Su-
preme Court of the United States may more readily grant a review, determine the
question, and definitely settle the matter for the future."".
ROBERT 0. HOELSCHER
TORTS-WRONGFUL DEATH-SuRvIvAL OF ACriON
Mennemeyer v. Hart'
Action by Arnold Mennemeyer and Anna Mennemeyer, husband and wife,
against Edward Hart, administrator of the estate of Virgil Mennemeyer, deceased,
to recover for the wrongful death of Gregory, the deceased minor son of the plain-
tiffs who was riding in an automobile driven by his brother, Virgil, when he was
killed. Virgil died as a result of the same accident. The plaintiffs alleged that
Virgil was negligent, and asserted that they were proceeding under Section 98,
Miissouri Revised Statutes (1939), which provides for bringing actions for all
wrongs done to property rights, or interest of another, against the wrongdoer or
his executor or administrator.
On appeal from a judgment of dismissal in the trial court, the Missouri Supreme
Court held that "this action is, in reality, a suit for wrongful death," and should
have been brought under Sections 3562 et seq., Missouri Revised Statutes (1939).
9. Note, 17 U. OF CIN. L. REv. 277, 279 (1948).
10. Kiang, Judicial Enforcement of Restrictive Covenants in tkze United States,
24 WASH. L. REv. 1 (1949). Comments and Notes: 9 LA. L. REv. 394 (1949); 24
N. Y. U. L. Q. REV. 227 (1949); 27 N. C. L. REV. 224 (1949). But contra: Note,
17 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 398 (1949).
11. 225 S.W. 2d 127, 131 (Mo. 1949).
1. 221 S.W. 2d 960 (Mo. 1949).
7
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Under this statute at the time of the death of the wrongdoer, the action did not
survive.
At common law no action lay for the death of a human being occasioned by
the negligent, or other wrongful, act of another, however close the relation between
deceased and the plaintiff or however clearly the death may cause pecuniary loss
to the latter.2 Various reasons supported this holding. Originally, it was based on
the doctrine that "by the death the civil injury was merged in the felony.'"3 It was
said to be inconsistent with the policy of the law to permit the value of human
life to become the subject of judicial computation.4 Another reason was the maxim
"actio personalis moritur cum persona," a personal action dies with the person.,
But the real reason 6 has been said to be Lord Ellenborough's opinion in the case of
Baker v. Bolton.' Of the result Prosser says,8 "in 1808, Lord Ellenborough, whose
forte was never common sense, held without citing any authority.., and declaring
in broad terms that 'in a civil court the death of a human being could not be com-
plained of as an injury."' This holding has been criticized both in England0 and
America," but has been accepted and followed.
Though it has been suggested by at least one authority"l that a change in this
2. Braun v. Riel, 40 S.W. 2d 621 (Mo. 1931); Rositzky v. Rositzky, 329 Mo.
662, 46 S.W. 2d 591 (1931); Bloss v. Dr. C. R. Woodson Sanitarium, 319 Mo. 1061,
5 S.W. 2d 367 (1928); Freie v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 283 Mo. 457, 222 S.W.
824 (1920); Buel v. United Rys., 248 Mo. 126, 154 S.W. 71 (1913); Gilkeson v.
Missouri P. Ry., 222 Mo. 173, 121 S.W. 138 (1909); Bates v. Sylvester, 205 Mo.
493, 104 S.W. 73 (1907).
3. Conners v. Burlington, C. R. & N. Ry., 71 Iowa 490, 32 N.W. 465 (1887);
McCarthy v. Chicago R. I. & P. R. R., 18 Kan. 46, 26 Am. Rep. 742 (1877); Louis-
ville & N. R. R. v. McElwain, 98 Ky. 700, 34 S.W. 236 (1896). See Annotations:
41 L.R.A. 807 (1898); 19 L.R.A. (NS) 633 (1909).
4. King v. Henkie, 80 Ala. 505 (1886); Philby v. Northern P. Ry., 46 Wash.
173, 89 Pac. 468 (1907). Annotations: 41 L.R.A. 808 (1898); 19 L.R.A. (NS) 633
(1909).
.5. Salsedo v. Palmer, 278 Fed. 92 (C.C.A. 2d 1921); McCarthy v. Chicago
R. I. & P. Ry., 18 Kan. 46 (1877); Louisville & N. R. R., 98 Ky. 700, 34 S.W. 236
(1896). It must be noted that if the wrongful death statutes are regarded as creat-
ing a new cause of action in the named beneficiaries, the maxim does not apply. It
only operates as to causes of actions belonging to injured persons which are made
to survive to the personal representatives of those persons.
6. 16 AM. Jun. 39; 32 L. Q. REv. 431 (1916); PoLLocr., LAw OF TORTS 67
(11th ed. 1920).
7. 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808).
8. PRossER ON TORTS 955 (1941).
9. Osborn v. Gillett, L. R. 8 Exch. 88 (1873); Clark v. London General Om-
nibus Co., 2 K.B. 648 (1906); Admiralty Comm'rs v. S. S. Amerika [1917J A.C. 38.
10. Van Amburg v. Vicksburg S. & P. R. R., 37 La. 650 (1885); Rowe v.
Richards, 35 S. D. 201, 151 N.W. 1001 (1915); West v. Boston & M. & R. R., 81
N. H. 522, 129 At]. 768 (1925). See Note, 7 HARV. L. R. 170 (1893).
11. W. S. Holdsworth, The Origin of the Rule in Baker v. Bolton, 32 L. Q.
Rnv. 431 (1916), "It may be urged that the rule in Baker v. Bolton, has been so
long accepted as a rule of English Law that it would not be right for the House
of Lords to disturb it." "It has been upheld in all the reported cases, not by
reasoning based upon a discussion of the question of its policy or impolicy, not by
any sufficient technical or historical reasons, but by the assertion that it is a rule
[Vol. is
8
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [1950], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol15/iss3/5
RECENT CASES
rule should be by common law judges instead of by statute, the intolerable situation
was remedied in England by the passage of the Fatal Accidents Act of 184612 better
known as Lord Campbell's Act, and today every American state has a statutory
remedy for wrongful death.
Missouri first modified the common law in 1835, by the enactment of what is
new Sections 98 and 99, Missouri Revised Statutes (1939), dealing with survival
of tort claims against property rights. The wrongful death statutes closely resembling
Lord Campbell's Act were first adopted in Missouri in 1855,13 and since the decision
in the James case1 - have provided the exclusive remedy for actions for loss of serv-
ices resulting from wrongful death. 15
There are two views as to the nature of wrongful death statutes. One, called
the survival theory.16 is based on the theory that the effect of the statutes is merely
to pick up the abated right of the decedent and permit it to be prosecuted by the
personal representative for the benefit of the designated beneficiaries. This view
is probably based upon the provision commonly found in wrongful death statutes
which allows the right of action only if the deceased could have maintained an
action for the same wrongful act if death had not ensued. The other and newer.
cause of action theory17 would seem to be based on the better reasoning, since the
cause of action is not for the injury to the decedent, but is for the loss sustained
by the beneficiaries because of the death and is distinct from any cause of action
which the decedent might have had if he had survived. The provisions that a re-
covery for the benefit of the persons designated may be had only under circum-
stances which would have supported a recovery by the decedent had he survived
of the common law which must be followed." "Nebraska '[I1n re Grainger's Estate,
237 N.W. 153 (Neb. 1931)] is the only state that has changed the common law
rule.., by judicial decision without statutory authorization. All other state courts
have waited for legislation and even then they have been reluctant to follow the
statutes, saying that statutes in derogation on the common law are to be strictly
construed." 10 TEx. L. REv. 247 (1932).
12. 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93.
13. Mo. REv. STAT. 1855, p. 647, § 2 et seq.
14. 18 Mo. 162 (1853).
15. Mennemeyer v. Hart, 221 S.W. 2d 960, 962 (Mo. 1949).
16. Williams v. Alabama G. S. R. Co., 158 Ala. 396, 48 So. 485 (1908); Kling
v. Torello, 87 Conn. 301, 87 At. 987 (1913); Cincinnati H. & D. Ry. v. McCullom,
183 Ind. 556, 109 N.E. 206 (1915), aff'd 245 U. S. 632 (1917); Sharp v. Cincin-
nati N. 0. & T. P. R. Co., 133 Tenn. 1, 179 S.W. 375 (1915). The new event is
not regarded as one which creates a cause of action, but one which has a bearing
upon the award of damages.
17. "Missouri has now, after leaning the other way, . . . definitely taken the
view that our statute gives a 'new and different cause of action to the beneficiary';
and that is because its very purpose was to give a cause of action where none
existed at common law. It did not revive a cause of action theretofore belonging
to the deceased, but it gave a new cause of action to named parties bearing rela-
tionship to the deceased." Cummins v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 334 Mo.
672, 66 S.W. 2d 920, 923 (1934); State ex rel. Thomas v. Daues, 314 Mo. 13, 283
S.W. 51 (1925). For earlier cases supporting the "survival theory," see Strode
v. St. Louis Transit Co., 197 Mo. 616, 95 S.W. 851 (1906); Hennessy v. Bavarian
Brewing Co., 145 Mo. 104, 46 S.W. 966 (1898); Miller v. Missouri P. Ry., 109 Mo.
350, 19 S.W. 58 (1891).
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merely renders it possible for the defendent to interpose any defense which would
have been available had the action been maintained by the decedent.18
Missouri has both the type of legislation which allows a survival of the cause
of action with recovery by the personal representatives of the deceased for personal
injuries which he suffered, and also the creation of a cause of action for the wrong-
ful death for the benefit of certain named beneficiaries.19
Under Section 3670, Missouri Revised Statutes (1939),20 the cause of action
which the decedent had for personal injuries survived to his personal representatives
and also against the personal representatives of the wrongdoer should he die. This
statute had been declared not to be applicable to injuries resulting in death, 2' and
the statute only permitted a survival where a suit had been instituted before the
death both of the injured party and the tort-feasor.22 Thus in the case of an
action based on the wrongful death statutes, the tort action did not survive the
death of the wrongdoer.
As is pointed out by the principal case, this situation has been remedied for the
future by the amendment of Section 3670, Missouri Revised Statutes (1939). The
legislature approved on May 6, 1948, an act (Laws of Missouri 1947, Vol. II, p. 225,
which became effective July 19, 1948) which repealed and re-enacted Section 3670.
The pertinent amendment provides: "Causes of action for. death shall not abate
by reason of the death of a party liable for such death, but shall survive against the
legal representative of such party."
Such change in the rights of the parties in regard to wrongful death actions
is held to create a substantive right rather than being merely a rule of procedure.23
Since at common law the personal representative could not be sued for a tort com-
mitted by the decedent during his life time,2 4 a new right has been given to the
18. HARPER ON ToRTs 610 (1933).
19. It might be well to emphasize, for the sake of clarity, that there are two
general types of statutes which are sometimes confused because of the use of sim-
ilar terms. One, known as the survival type, which allows the personal representa-
tive to recover for personal injuries or on causes of actions which the decedent had
against a wrongdoer; and the second type, known as the wrongful death statute,
under which the cause of action is for the wrong done to the named beneficiaries.
There are two theories under the latter type-the survival theory and the new
cause of action theory. We are primarily concerned with the wrongful death type,
herein, though Missoun RnvzsED STATUTES, Section 3670, now provides as amended,
that neither the cause of action of the decedent nor the cause of action of the bene-
ficiaries shall abate by reason of death.
20. First adopted, Mo. Laws 1907, p. 252.
21. Hendricks v. Kauffman, 340 Mo. 74, 101 S.W. 2d 84 (1936); Burg v.
Knox, 334 Mo. 329, 67 S.W. 2d 96 (1933); Ryan v. Ortgier, 201 Mo. App. 1, 208
S.W. 856 (1918); Downs v. United Rys., 184 S.W. 995 (Mo. 1916).
22. Walker v. Ross, 230 Mo. App. 378, 71 S.W. 2d 124 (1934); Heil v. Rule,
327 Mo. 84, 34 S.W. 2d 90 (1931); McIntosh v. Rule, 34 S.W. 2d 91 (Mo. 1931);
Shupe v. Martin, 321 Mo. 811, 12 S.W. 2d 450 (1929); Primm v. Schlingmann, 212
Mo. App. 133, 253 S.W. 469 (1923).
23. Martin v. Railroad, 151 U.S. 692 (1893); Schreiber v. Sharpless, 110
U. S. 80 (1883); Siberell v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 320 Mo. 916, 9 S.W. 2d
912 (1928); also see 25 R.C.L. 787; 77 A.L.R. 1344 (1932).
24. HARPER ON TORTS 673 (1933).
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named beneficiary and a new obligation has been imposed upon the defendant-a
new liability attached in respect of past occurrences. On the date of the fatal acci-
dent in the principal case, May 2, 1948, the newly amended provision was not in
effect, and though the action was brought after it went into effect the determination
of whether the right of action survived is governed by the statutes in force at the
time of the wrongdoer's death.
25
The court said in the principal case, "Unless there is a clearly expressed legis-
lative intention to the contrary, which is not present here, such a statute is
prospective, not retrospective, in its operation." If the inference to be drawn from
the statement is that the legislature could, by manifesting a clear intention, have
made this amendment retrospective in scope, it would seem that the inference is
questionable. The Constitution of Missouri, 1945,28 provides that "no ex post
facto law, nor law impairing the obligation of contracts, or retrospective in its
operation, . . ." can be enacted. Thus it would seem that if the statute were given
a retrospective effect it would be violative of the constitution.
In this regard the supreme court said in Clark v. Kanisas City, St. L. & C.
R. R.,2 7 "the law must take away such vested right, or it must create a new obliga-
tion, impose a new duty or attach a new disability in respect to gone-by transac-
tions in order. to be retrospective and under the constitutional ban." Section 3670,
as it now stands, imposes a new duty or creates a new obligation upon the personal
representative of the wrongdoer and thus would seem to be exemplary of the nature
of statutes prohibited by the constitution.
28
FRED KLING
25. Bates v. Sylvester, 205 Mo. 493, 104 S.W. 73 (1907); Siberell v. St. Louis-
San Francisco Ry., 320 Mo. 916, 9 S.W. 2d 912 (1928); Shupe v. Martin, 321 Mo.
811, 12 S.W. 2d 450 (1928); Rositzky v. Rositzky, 329 Mo. 662, 46 S.W. 2d 591
(1931). See 1 C.J.S. 181.
26. Art. 1, Sec. 13.
27. 219 Mo. 524, 118 S.W. 40 (1909). The Statute involved in the Clark case
was an amendment changing the period of limitations, which the court recognized
as procedural and not substantive in that the right or cause of action, itself, was not
affected.
28. Smellie v. Southern P. Co., 211 Cal. 371, 287 Pac. 343 (1930); Chicago,
St. Louis & N. 0. R. R. v. Pounds, 11 Lea 127 (Tenn. 1883); Slate v. Fort Worth,
193 S.W. 1143 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917); also see 16 AM. J. 41; 77 A.L.R. 1344 (1932).
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